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Abstract
This paper analyses why a …rm chooses foreign direct investment
rather than arms-length contracts in supplying overseas markets. When
contracts are incomplete we show that this choice must balance the moral
hazard associated with external markets against that associated with in-
ternal markets. We show that arms-length contracts are preferred when
the overseas agent has limited opportunities for changing product tech-
nology or if there are few spillover e¤ects from foreign to home market.
Internalization is preferred when the advantages of the …rm are knowledge-
based and when reputational e¤ects are strong.
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1 Introduction
This paper revisits and extends analysis of …rms’ choices of the means by which
they serve their overseas markets when contracts between the …rms and their
overseas agents are incomplete. In particular, we consider the forces that lead
a …rm to maintain control of its overseas operations through foreign direct in-
vestment rather than confer that control on an independent agent through a
licensing or franchising arrangement. The policy relevance of this topic can-
not be overstated. World production is increasingly dominated by international
oligopolies, with a growing degree of market interpenetration. These …rms are
making strategic decisions on how to serve their target markets that have impor-
tant implications for trade ‡ows, home and host country employment, knowledge
transfer and technological improvement. Their choices with respect to modes of
market serving and consequent value-creating activities are a¤ected by domestic
and international trade policies in ways that are not at all well accounted for
in “traditional” trade models that focus on competitive markets and the role of
comparative advantage and factor endowments as determinants of trade ‡ows.
If a …rm chooses foreign direct investment as a means by which to serve
its overseas markets it is then considered to become a multinational enterprise,
1de…ned as a …rm that “acquires a substantial controlling interest in a foreign …rm
or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country.” (Markusen, 1995) The important
question considered in this paper is why a …rm chooses multinationality rather
than some other form of direct operation in foreign markets such as a joint
venture operation, a strategic alliance or licensing.
The approach we adopt is in the tradition initiated by Hymer (his 1960 dis-
sertation published as Hymer, 1976) and formalized, in particular, by Dunning
(see, for example, 1977, 1981), Buckley and Casson (1976, 1985) and Rugman
(1981, 1985, 1996). A common feature of their work is that foreign direct in-
vestment is the response by a …rm to a particular type of market failure. The
basic idea, to which we return in more detail below, is that incomplete con-
tracts and missing markets give rise to the possibility of opportunistic behavior
in arms-length exchange (Williamson, 1975) and so to the preference by the
…rm to replace external contracts by direct ownership and internal hierarchies.
What is missing from the analysis, and provides the main motivation for this
paper, is that similar problems of contractual incompleteness and opportunistic
behavior occur inside …rms. In other words, we treat the choice of a hierar-
chical structure, characterized by foreign direct investment, as compared to a
market structure, characterized by contracts between independent entities, as
being driven by the desire of the …rm to select the organizational structure that
minimizes its exposure to opportunistic behavior.1
The seminal work of Hymer starts from the principle that multinational
enterprises operate at an inherent disadvantage with respect to national …rms
because of the additional costs of doing business abroad. These costs derive from
communications and management problems that arise in running an operation at
a distance, consumer attitudes to “foreign” …rms, language, culture and other
operational barriers, and the costs of being outside the normal business and
government networks. For the overseas a¢liate to be pro…table in the face of
these disadvantages, it must possess compensating advantages such as superior
technology or products, or …rm-level economies of scale.
This general approach has been codi…ed in the eclectic paradigm developed
by Dunning and the internalization theory (or paradigm) developed by Rug-
man. The eclectic paradigm suggests that foreign direct investment arises when
three conditions are satis…ed. First, the …rm must possess speci…c, ownership
advantages not available to other …rms. These advantages can be tangible, such
as a superior technology, patents on particular products or processes, or domes-
tic …rm size that generates transferable economies of scale and scope. Or the
advantages can be intangible, perhaps embodied in a brand name, trademark or
other indication of product quality, or deriving from the …rm’s having favored
1The market failure approach to foreign direct investment stands in contrast to the game
theoretic approach developed by, for example, Horstman and Markusen (1992), Motta (1992),
Motta and Norman (1996). This analysis treats the choice between exporting and foreign
direct investment as a purely strategic issue with the choice of mode of market serving emerg-
ing as the Nash equilibrium to a stage game. With the possible exception of Ethier and
Markusen (1996), this literature pays no attention to the issues of contractual incompleteness
that motivate our analysis .
2access to particular customers.
Secondly, the foreign market should o¤er some location advantages that
make it more pro…table to serve the overseas market by local production rather
than by exporting. Obvious candidates are high tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers
to exports or stringent anti-dumping regulations that inhibit the …rm’s ability
to price its exports to re‡ect local market conditions. Market size is another
important location advantage since large markets make it easier to o¤set the
set-up costs associated with establishing an overseas a¢liate.
Thirdly, there should be an internalization advantage in that the …rm be-
lieves that its ownership advantages are best exploited internally rather than
sold directly through spot markets or o¤ered to other …rms through some con-
tractual arrangement such as licensing, the establishment of a joint venture or
management contracting. This advantage derives from the di¢culties that arise
in writing enforceable and controllable contracts with potential overseas part-
ners that generate an income that approximates the true worth of the advantage
being marketed. It is in this third element that the eclectic paradigm shares
much in common with Rugman’s internalization theory. The main di¤erence
between the two paradigms has been described by Dunning (1995):
“The eclectic paradigm ... is di¤erent from internalization theory
in that it treats the competitive (so-called O-speci…c) advantages
of MNEs ... as endogenous rather than as exogenous variables.”
(Dunning, 1995, p. 465)
The decision to internalize an ownership-speci…c advantage is also a decision
not to market that advantage to other …rms. Important reasons causing the …rm
to choose internalization that have concerned many investigators are the public
good nature of knowledge-based ownership advantages and the informational
asymmetry inherent in them. If the …rm has superior knowledge, for example
about the performance characteristics of its product or the technology embodied
in the product, it will be reluctant to reveal the information truthfully to a
potential licensee since no e¤ective contract can be written to protect the …rm
from post-contractual opportunism on the part of the licensee. A point not
often made in this type of analysis is that this type of asymmetry can run both
ways. By an exactly analogous argument, if a potential licensee has superior
information about local market conditions he will be reluctant to reveal this
truthfully to the …rm, in this case because incomplete contracts will not protect
the licensee from post-contractual opportunism of the …rm.
In addition, just as knowledge can easily be transferred internationally by
licensing agreements, particularly between countries at similar levels of develop-
ment, so it is likely that this knowledge can be quickly learned and potentially
extended by those to whom it is licensed. The fear of defection by the licensee
- for example, by starting up a new enterprise in competition with the licensing
…rm - may well make the potential licensor favor internalization over licensing,
particularly since it is di¢cult to write enforceable contracts to prevent such de-
fection. Analogous problems arise when the …rm’s ownership advantage derives
3primarily from intangible assets such as reputation. The ability of the …rm to
extract rents from potential licensees is limited by the incentive that licensees
have to skimp on quality, damaging the …rm in all of its markets.
It should not be thought, however, that the risks of moral hazard that un-
derlie these problems are con…ned to a …rm’s external relations with potential
licensees. We know from the work of, for example, Hart and Moore (1990),
Hart (1995) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) that similar moral hazard prob-
lems arise within the various divisions of a …rm. This is even more likely to
be the case when the divisions operate in di¤erent countries with di¤erent cul-
tures and at considerable social and economic distances from the headquarters
operation (see Akerlof, 1997 for recent discussions of the importance of social
distance). With internalization, the overseas agent is appointed by the principal
but the principal retains residual rights of control. Nevertheless, it remains the
case that the agent’s actions are imperfectly observable and contractible by the
principal giving rise to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the agent.
One the other hand, the agent runs the risk that the rewards from e¤orts ex-
pended to improve the joint pay-o¤s of agent and principal can be expropriated
by the principal, giving rise to the incentive for opportunistic behavior by the
principal.
What this implies, in other words, is that the choice between foreign di-
rect investment and arms-length contractual arrangements such as licencing or
alliance formation should balance the e¢ciency costs of opportunistic behav-
ior when using internal markets against the same costs when using external
markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we
present some information on the importance of foreign direct investment and
the empirical regularities it exhibits that are directly relevant to our analysis.
In the next section we develop a stylized model that allows us to analyze the
e¤ects of opportunistic behavior in both external and internal contracts. Sec-
tion 4 highlights the factors that determine ownership structure and our main
conclusions are presented in section 5.
2 Some Empirical Regularities
There has been a particularly rapid expansion of foreign direct investment over
the past two decades. UNCTAD and OECD data indicate that fdi has grown
some four times as fast as exports over this period. Moreover, as the data in
Table 1 indicate, the stock of fdi has also grown steadily as a proportion of
GDP. Nor does there seem to be any indication that this growth is slowing
down. For example, Mataloni (1997) indicates that the operations of “nonbank
US multinationals grew more rapidly in 1995 than they had grown, on average,
since 1982.”
Table 1 and Table 2 further indicate that the great majority of fdi ‡ows
have been between developed countries, especially within the OECD. The ex-
tremely rapid growth of fdi in the European Union is particularly noteworthy.
4The completion of the Single Market in the European Union had the e¤ect of
signi…cantly reducing the intra-EU barriers to trade but also held the threat
of increasing the extra-EU tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers: what has come to be
referred to as the threat of “Fortress Europe”. In addition, the period from the
mid-1980’s in Europe saw a more concerted anti-dumping stance with respect
to the exports to Europe of …rms, particularly but not exclusively based in
the Far East (Tharakan, 1991). These changes signi…cantly altered the relative
attractiveness of exporting to the EU countries and fdi in the EU: in the lan-
guage of the eclectic paradigm, these changes signi…cantly changed the L-based
attractions of direct operations in the EU.
(Tables 1 and 2 near here)
Table 3 hints at further features of foreign direct investment. It seems clear
that there is a remarkable similarity in the industrial mix of fdi out‡ows and fdi
in‡ows.2 In other words, not only have the past two decades seen a remarkable
growth in intra-industry trade, they have also seen a remarkable growth in intra-
industry foreign direct investment. Apparently, the economic forces that lead
a …rm based in country X to set up direct operations in country Y will also
encourage a …rm based in country Y to set up direct operations in country X.
(Table 3 near here)
There are some further empirical regularities that should be noted and that
have guided theoretical developments. First, the great majority of foreign direct
investment, at least in the United States and in Europe, has been “horizontal”.3
The foreign a¢liates supply a substantial proportion of their output to local
markets rather than exporting intermediate products back to the home-country
assembly operations of the parent companies. Even given this, however, a grow-
ing proportion of international trade is intra-…rm trade (UNCTAD, 1997).
Secondly, there appears to be little indication that di¤erences in factor en-
dowments between countries are associated with ‡ows of foreign direct invest-
ment (Brainard, 1993).
Thirdly, there is strong evidence that tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to trade
directly a¤ect multinationality: see, for example, Brainard (1997). In addition,
there is growing evidence that the decision to adopt fdi is signi…cantly a¤ected
by the emergence of regional free-trade blocs in Europe, the Asia-Paci…c Rim
and North America: see the evidence cited in Motta and Norman (1996).
Fourthly, there are important di¤erences across industries in the extent to
which multinational companies dominate production. The industry and …rm
characteristics that appear to be most closely related to multinationality are:
² high levels of R&D relative to sales;
2See also Norman and Dunning (1984) for earlier and much more detailed analysis.
3A possible exception to this is Japanese foreign direct investment in the Far East, where
a rather greater proportion of output is exported to parent companies in Japan.
5² a high proportion of professional and technical workers;
² new products or products that incorporate complex technologies;
² high levels of advertising.
Finally, multinationals also tend to be …rms with a high proportion of in-
tangible assets (Morck and Yeung, 1991) but with relatively weak plant-level
economies of scale.
It is clear that these characteristics have much in common. There is, in
particular, the obvious implication that knowledge-intensive …rms or …rms that
manufacture complex products for which quality is important are more likely
to be multinational. The natural reason for this, which we investigate in more
detail below, is that this type of …rm …nds it more di¢cult and costly to exploit
whatever competitive advantages it might have either through exporting or by
commissioning an independent …rm to operate on its behalf.
3 Internalization Revisited
The central question we investigate is why a …rm, in supplying overseas mar-
kets, chooses to invest directly in production operations in those countries rather
than, for example, entering into licensing or franchising agreements with local
companies in the target countries. In the language of the eclectic or internal-
ization paradigms, the decision to internalize an ownership-speci…c advantage
is also a decision not to market that advantage to other …rms. We noted in the
introduction that there are important reasons causing the …rm to choose inter-
nalization: for example, the public good nature of knowledge-based ownership
advantages and the informational asymmetry inherent in them.
We also noted, however, that the risks of moral hazard that underlie these
problems are not con…ned to a …rm’s external relations with potential licensees.
Precisely the same moral hazard problems arise within the various geograph-
ically separated divisions of a multinational enterprise. What this implies, in
other words, is that foreign direct investment should be preferred when the moral
hazard associated with using external markets is greater than that associated
with using internal markets.
We develop a stylized model to illustrate this point. Assume that a …rm E
is considering whether to supply an overseas market through a licensing agree-
ment4 with a domestic …rm L or by establishing a subsidiary with a local man-
ager M. If the licensing agreement is signed it confers residual control rights
to L in return for an agreed license fee of P0. With a local subsidiary, M can
expect to receive a pro…t share and has a base salary P0. E must enter into
a long-term contract with either L or M in order to encourage the necessary
relationship-speci…c investment by L or M. This contract provides for a good
to be produced at an agreed quality. E knows that the good can be sold for a
4We can think of this agreement as giving the licensee the right either to produce the good
or to market the good on E’s behalf.
6price B0 and that it can be produced at cost C0. If L provides the good the
licensing agreement de…nes L’s pro…t, while if M provides the good his contract
is an incentive-based, pro…t-sharing contract.
Either L or M can use their local knowledge to modify the good but the
actions they take to do so are su¢ciently complex as to be uncontractible ex
ante. Rather, E indicates that he will be willing to renegotiate the contract
once these actions are observable. There are two types of modi…cation:
² cost reducing innovation:
L or M can apply e¤ort r to secure a cost reduction c(r). This cost reduction
is, however, also associated with a quality reduction that reduces the value of
the good to consumers by d(r) in the local market and, through its reputational
e¤ect, by d¤ (r) in E’s home market.
² quality enhancing innovation:
L or M can apply e¤ort e to enhance the quality of the basic good. The
improvement is valued by consumers at q (e) in the local market and the repu-
tational spillover to E’s home market is q¤ (e).
Standard assumptions are made regarding the concavity/convexity of c;d;d¤,
q and q¤:
c(0) = 0;c0 > 0;c00 < 0;c0 (0) = 1;c0 (1) = 0;
d0;d¤0 > 0;d00;d¤00 > 0;d(0) = d¤ (0) = 0;
q0;q¤0 > 0;q00;q¤00 < 0;q (0) = q¤ (0) = 0;q0 (0) = q¤0 (0) = 1;q0 (1) =
q¤0 (1) = 0.
The quality e¤ects of the two types of innovation are important in that they
re‡ect the moral hazard implicit in both licensing and foreign direct investment.
Contractual incompleteness between E and L or M leads to a situation in
which modi…cation of the basic good does not lead to a breach of contract.
Moreover, while r and e and their e¤ects are observable by E;L and M they
cannot be con…rmed by any of the parties to outside agencies and so cannot be
made the subjects of enforceable contracts. Any cost or quality innovation can
be made solely with the agreement of the individual with residual control rights.
Thus M must have E’s permission for any innovation whereas L does not need
such permission. L retains any additional net revenues created by his e¤orts in
L’s home market (E’s foreign market), while not having to recompense E for
any negative externalities that arise in E’s home market. However, L receives
no payment from E for any positive externalities that L’s e¤orts generate in E’s
home market. By contrast, with foreign direct investment residual control rights
remain with E. Moreover, it is possible for E to expropriate the bene…ts of M’s
innovations by replacing M. We assume that M has some power, however, in
that E cannot fully implement M’s ideas should M be replaced. Speci…cally, we
assume that E is able to implement only a fraction 0 < 1¡h < 1 of the net gains
¡(d(r) + d¤ (r)) + c(r) + q (e) + q¤ (e) from M’s innovative ideas by replacing
M with another manager hired at cost. The remainder is embodied in M’s
human capital. The parameter h captures the incentive that M has to identify
7and introduce cost reducing and quality enhancing innovations.5 In particular,
if h = 0 so that M’s ideas are fully appropriable by E then no innovations will
be suggested by M, while if h = 1 then M is essential to the e¤ective operation
of the overseas a¢liate.
The resulting sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1. As this …gure
indicates, the individuals involved will want to renegotiate the contract at date
1 once the potential cost and quality innovations have been identi…ed and ar-
ticulated. We assume that the gains from renegotiation are distributed 50:50
between the relevant parties: the Nash bargaining solution. Any such renego-
tiation must, of course, re‡ect the residual control rights of the activity and so
will be a¤ected by the default pay-o¤s of E;L and M. The default pay-o¤s are
determined as follows.
(Figure 1 near here)
(A) With a licensing agreement and without renegotiation, L has the incen-
tive to make both cost and quality innovations since L has the residual control
rights, E’s default pay-o¤ is
Ud
E = P0 ¡ d¤ (r) + q¤ (e) (1)
and L’s default pay-o¤ is
Ud
L = B0 ¡ P0 ¡ C0 + c(r) ¡ d(r) + q (e) ¡ r ¡ e (2)
(B) With the establishment of a local subsidiary and without renegotiation,
E will replace M. Both innovations are implemented but E achieves only the
share 1 ¡ h of these. E’s default pay-o¤ is
Ud
E = B0 ¡ P0 ¡ C0 + (1 ¡ h)(¡(d(r) + d¤ (r)) + c(r) + q (e) + q¤ (e)) (3)
and M’s default pay-o¤ is
Ud
M = P0 ¡ r ¡ e (4)
We begin by identifying the value-maximizing equilibrium if e and r were
to be contractible. In such a case the parties involved would choose e and r to
maximize the joint pay-o¤ to their coalition. Thus, r and e are chosen to solve:
max
r;e [¡d(r) ¡ d¤ (r) + c(r) + q(e) + q¤ (e) ¡ r ¡ e] (5)
Given our concavity assumptions this has a unique solution (r¤;e¤) de…ned
by the …rst-order conditions equating marginal social cost of an innovation with
its marginal social bene…t:
¡d0 (r) ¡ d¤0 (r) + c0 (r) = 1 (6)
5See Milgrom and Roberts (1992) for an excellent discussion of incentive-based compensa-
tion schemes in such principal-agent situations.
8q0 (e) + q¤0 (e) = 1 (7)
Now consider the actual equilibrium that will be achieved after renegotiation
with the alternative ownership structures.
3.1 Licensing:
With a licensing agreement, renegotiation will relate to additional payments
from E to L to internalize the spillover q¤ (e). The resulting gains will be split
50:50 between E and L. The pay-o¤s are now:
Ul





L = B0 ¡ P0 ¡ C0 + c(r) ¡ d(r) + q (e) +
q¤ (e)
2
¡ r ¡ e (9)
Since L can correctly anticipate that renegotiation will take place, he will
choose r and e to maximize Ul
L. This gives the …rst-order conditions:





There are two distortions from …rst-best re‡ecting the fact that L receives
only partial payment for internalizing the spillover e¤ects of his innovations.
First, L underestimates the detrimental impact of cost reducing innovations on
product quality since he does not have to pay E for any negative externality
from quality reduction. Secondly, he underestimates the bene…cial impact of
quality enhancing innovations since he receives payment for only part of the
positive externalities his e¤orts generate.
3.2 Direct Ownership
If E sets up a local a¢liate then renegotiation takes place with M over the pro…t
generated by the fraction h of M’s innovative ideas that E cannot expropriate
if he replaces M. These have value h(¡(d(e)+d¤(e))+c(e)+q(i)+q¤(i)¡C0)
and will be shared equally so that the pay-o¤s to E and L will be:
U
f






¡d(r) ¡ d¤ (r)+





M = P0 +
h
2
(¡d(r) ¡ d¤ (r) + c(r) + q (e) + q¤ (e) ¡ C0) ¡ r ¡ e (13)
9In this case M chooses r and e to maximize U
f




(¡d0 (rM) ¡ d¤0 (rM) + c0 (rM)) = 1 (14)
h
2
(q0 (eM) + q¤0 (eM)) = 1 (15)
The manager M does take account of the impact that his innovations have
on the pro…ts of E as a result of the pro…t-based incentive scheme that he has
been o¤ered. However, this incentive is weaker than it should be because the
threat of replacement means that the manager is unable to reap the full bene…ts
of his quality innovation ideas and is not fully compensated for scaling down his
cost but quality reducing innovations.
3.3 Ownership Structure
The …rst-order conditions 7, 11, and 15 are illustrated in Figure 2 and the
conditions 6, 10 and 14 are illustrated in Figure 3. These conditions con…rm
that there are moral hazard problems that give rise to distortions with both
ownership structures, the element that we have indicated is missing from much
of the discussion of internalization. Speci…cally, licensing leads to an equilibrium
in which rL > r¤ and eL < e¤. In other words, the licensee is induced to make
excessive cost reducing and insu¢cient quality enhancing innovative e¤ort. If
E chooses to establish an overseas a¢liate instead, the spillover e¤ects of M’s
ideas are taken partially into account. However, the weakness of the incentives
o¤ered to the local manager M as a result of the threat of replacement leads to an
ine¢ciently low level of both cost reducing and quality enhancing innovations:
rM < r¤ and eM < e¤. Moreover, because E o¤ers M weaker incentives for
quality improving innovations than he o¤ers to L, we also …nd that eM < eL.
(Figures 2 and 3 near here)
There is an immediate implication from these results that accords well with
the theoretical discussion of the advantages of internalization versus the use of
external markets to exploit an ownership advantage.
Theorem 1 Costs C0¡c(r) will always be lower with licensing than with direct
ownership but local quality B0¡d(r)+q(r) and total quality B0¡d(r)¡d¤ (r)+
q(e) + q¤ (e) may be higher or lower.







M since this gives the greatest scope for mutually
bene…cial exchange between E and either L or M. In doing so, E must balance
the two sets of distortions we have identi…ed. Licensing gives the licensee an
excessive incentive to pursue cost and quality reducing innovations while placing
10too little weight upon quality improving innovations. Internalization and direct
ownership, by contrast, gives the local manager too weak an incentive to pursue
cost and quality reducing innovations while giving even less weight than licensing
to quality improving innovations. The following propositions shed light on the
forces that determine the relative ranking of licensing and direct ownership.
Theorem 2 (1) Let the negative spillover d¤(r) be represented by ®¤d¤(r).
Then licensing will be preferred to direct ownership for ®¤ su¢ciently small.
(2) Let the negative spillovers d(r) and d¤(r) be represented by ®d(r) and
®¤d¤(r), and the cost reduction c(r) be represented by ¯c(r). Then licensing will
be preferred to direct ownership for ®;a¤ and ¯ su¢ciently small.
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is simple enough and accords well with the
literature on internalization. Part (1) is a direct consequence of the fact that a
very low value of the parameter ®¤ is equivalent to the negative spillover e¤ect
on product quality from cost reducing innovations being negligible. If this
condition is satis…ed then licensing generates cost reducing innovations that
are “nearly” socially e¢cient while also having a level of quality improving
innovation that is nearer to …rst-best than does direct ownership. In other words,
licensing is preferred when the cost-reducing innovations of either the licensee or
the local manager have very weak negative spillover e¤ects on perceived product
quality in E’s home market since then the stronger incentives to reduce costs
and improve product quality that characterize licensing are socially bene…cial.
Part (2) follows since very low values of the parameters ®;a¤ and ¯ imply
that the opportunities for cost and quality reducing innovation are limited so
that the equilibrium values of cost reducing innovative e¤ort rL;rM and r¤ are
all near zero. As a result, the choice of quality improving innovation e deter-
mines the value-maximizing ownership structure, with the e¤ect that licensing
is preferred. In this case the opportunities open to either the licensee or the
local manager for cost and quality reducing innovation are limited. It follows
that the cost reducing e¤orts of the licensee will not be particularly damaging
whereas his stronger incentive to undertake quality improving innovations is
desirable.
Theorem 2 can be restated in a more intuitive way.
Licensing is likely to be preferred when the activities of the licensee in
his home market are unlikely to damage the licensor’s home market
and/or there are limited opportunities for changing the licensor’s
production technology.
Under what circumstances will internalization and direct ownership be prefer-
able?
Theorem 3 (1) Suppose that the cost reducing innovation is given by c(r) =
d(r) + d¤(r) + °b(r) and let the local impact on quality q(e) be given by ±q(e).
Then for °;± su¢ciently small and h su¢ciently close to 1, direct ownership
will be preferred to licensing.
11(2) Suppose that the cost reducing innovation is given by c(r) = d(r) +
d¤(r) + °b(r) and let the impact on quality q(e);q¤(e) be given by ±q(e) and
±
¤q¤(e). Then for °;±;±
¤ su¢ciently small and h su¢ciently close to 1, direct
ownership will be preferred to licensing.
When the parameter ° is close to zero the conditions of part (1) are such
that the gains from cost saving innovation are fully o¤set by the quality reducing
e¤ects these innovations have in home and host country markets. As a result,
the weak incentives for cost reduction with direct ownership are e¢cient. By
contrast, the licensee continues to have an ine¢ciently strong incentive to im-
plement cost reductions since the licensee ignores the negative quality spillover
of this type of innovation. With ± near to zero and h near to 1, the incentives
that the licensee and the manager have to make quality improving innovations
are roughly identical. Combining these conditions leads to the conclusion that
direct ownership is preferred to licensing.
The conditions of part (2) imply that the equilibrium values of quality im-
proving innovative e¤ort eL;eM and e¤ are all approximately zero, meaning that
it is the choice of cost reducing innovative e¤ort r that determines social e¢-
ciency. By the same argument as for part (1), when ° is small direct ownership
is preferable since the licensee ignores the negative spillover of his cost reducing
e¤orts.
This proposition also has an appealing intuition. Direct ownership through
internalization is likely to be preferred when cost reduction has a strong quality
reducing e¤ect in E’s home and foreign markets since the incentive of the local
manager to make such damaging cost reductions is weaker than for the licensee.
However, this is not su¢cient of itself. First, it must also be the case that the
quality improving e¤orts by the licensee (and the local manager) are relatively
weak. This is more likely to be the case when there are few opportunities for
quality improving innovations by either the licensee or the manager. Secondly,
it must be the case that the manager has strong incentives to suggest those
innovations that he can since they are embodied in his human capital (h near
1). In other words, Theorem 3 can also be restated in a more intuitive way.
Internalization is likely to be preferred when cost reduction reduces
quality and when there are limited opportunities for quality improve-
ment. These conditions apply when ownership advantages are knowledge-
based and when reputational e¤ects are strong.
When seen in this light, they are precisely the situations that have been
identi…ed in the literature as favoring internalization over external marketing of
ownership advantages.
3.4 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to show how recent advances in organization
theory can add considerably to our understanding of why …rms choose to in-
12ternalize particular competitive advantages rather than exploit them through
external markets.
It has long been recognized that a major motivation for a …rm to choose
foreign direct investment as the mode for supplying overseas markets is to avoid
the risks inherent in incomplete contracts between the …rm and its overseas
agents who operate outside its direct control. We have extended this analysis
by introducing the possibility of there being incomplete contracts within …rms
as well as between …rms. In these circumstances, we have shown that the choice
of ownership structure must balance the …rm’s exposure to moral hazard when
using external markets against its exposure to moral hazard when using internal
markets.
When the actions of the …rm’s external agent or its appointed manager are
imperfectly observable, the actions chosen by the agent or manager are unlikely
to be value maximizing. Speci…cally, suppose that the agent or manager can,
through their own e¤orts, introduce cost/quality reducing and quality enhanc-
ing innovations that a¤ect consumers’ valuation of the …rm’s good both in its
overseas markets and, through spillover or reputational e¤ects, in the …rm’s
domestic markets. Then we have seen that with direct ownership (fdi) the
manager has an ine¢ciently low incentive to make either type of innovation.
By contrast, the external agent has too strong an incentive to introduce cost-
reducing innovations and too weak an incentive to introduce quality-enhancing
innovations.
The result is that the employment of an external agent is likely to be pre-
ferred when the spillover e¤ects from the …rm’s overseas market to its domestic
market are weak or where the ability of the external agent to implement cost
and quality reduing innovations is limited. By contrast, fdi is likely to be
preferred when cost reducing innovations have sharp quality reducing e¤ects in
both overseas and domestic markets and, as a result perhaps of the nature of
the technology, the overseas agent or manager has limited ability to introduce
quality enhancing innovations.
While the stylized model that we have presented is best seen as a model
of horizontal fdi, it is clear from the work of Hart, Milgrom, Roberts and oth-
ers that precisely the same techniques can be used to analyze vertical relations
and so can be applied to vertical fdi, which is growing apace. Such an exten-
sion should allow us investigate whether the ability to operate across national
boundaries strengthens a …rm’s desire to own and operate separate stages of pro-
duction or whether modern advances in, for example, information technology
will lead to more extensive use of independent external suppliers.
Much remains to be done in this important area of economic analysis. In
particular, direct empirical testing of the implications of our analysis has made
some advances but still relies, perhaps excessively, on proxy variables. There is
a need to build more on, for example, the early case study and survey work of
Dunning to understand more fully the motivations behind foreign direct invest-
ment, the relationship between parent and a¢liate, and the reasons companies
have for rejecting, or accepting alternative approaches such as licensing.
Finally, there are important policy issues that remain to be investigated. An
13indirect implication of our analysis is that a …rm’s decision to serve an overseas
market at all is likely to be a¤ected in important ways by the regulatory and
contractual regime in place. But this in‡uence should be expected to work
both ways. The growing importance of major global companies that are inter-
nationally footloose should be expected to in‡uence the regulatory regimes in
their target markets. For example, it is easy to cite cases in which international
companies have “captured” the framers of trade and regulatory policy by induc-
ing them to get involved in bidding wars to attract particular investments. This
has important implications for strategic trade policy that are currently largely
undeveloped.
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16Table 1: Global Foreign Direct Investment Stocks
1980 1985 1990 1995
Outward FDI
World
$billion 513.7 685.5 1684.1 2730.1
GDP (%) 4.9 5.9 8.1 9.7
OECD
$billion 501.5 657.4 1606.2 2503.2
GDP (%) 6.8 6.1 10.6 13.2
EU-15
$billion 213.2 286.5 777.2 1208.8
GDP (%) 7.4 7.1 13.8 17.4
Inward FDI
World
$billion 481.9 734.9 1716.9 2657.9
GDP (%) 4.6 6.3 8.3 9.4
OECD
$billion 356.4 526.3 1361.4 1922.0
GDP (%) 4.8 4.9 9.0 10.1
EU-15
$billion 185.0 226.5 712.2 1028.1
GDP (%) 6.4 5.6 12.7 14.8
Source: Barrell and Pain (1997)
Table 2: FDI and Export Flows 1987-1991
Investment Exports
Developed to Other Developed 80% 61%
Developed to Less Developed 17% 15%
Less Developed to Developed 2% 15%
Less Developed to Less Developed 1% 8%
Source: Markusen and Venables (1995)
17Table 3: Total Assets and Gross Product of US A¢liates Overseas
and Overseas A¢liates in the US, 1995
(millions of dollars)
Total Assets Gross Product
Industry US A¢liates Overseas US A¢liates Overseas
Overseas A¢liates Overseas A¢liates
in the US in the US
Petroleum 203,386 104,358 100.363 30,525
Manufacturing 633,696 587,049 232,764 156,991
Food 72,228 57,195 25,159 12,229
Chemicals 151,407 191,614 48,104 39,768
Metals 27,369 55,979 9,187 17,804
Machinery 102,583 43,391 34,444 13,693
Electronic 64,353 52,739 24,969 18,470
Transport Equip’t 91,909 34,125 36,905 9,478
Other 123,847 152,007 53,997 45,550
Wholesale trade 200,163 222,616 55,785 39,135
Finance 1,177,183 1,179,669 14,826 17,041
Services 95,341 110,674 33,695 23,753
Other 103,464 131,264 25,527 35,561
Source: Survey of Current Business, June and October, 1997
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Figure 3: Cost Reducing E¤ort
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